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Abstract. We introduce a two-variable model to describe spatial polarization, rad-
icalization, and conflict. Individuals in the model harbor a continuous belief variable
as well as a discrete radicalization level expressing their tolerance to neighbors with
different beliefs. A novel feature of our model is that it incorporates a bistable radi-
calization process to address memory-dependent social behavior. We demonstrate how
bistable radicalization may explain contradicting observations regarding whether social
segregation exacerbates or alleviates conflicts. We also extend our model by introducing
a mechanism to include institutional influence, such as propaganda or education, and ex-
amine its effectiveness. In some parameter regimes, institutional influence may suppress
the progression of radicalization and allow a population to achieve social conformity over
time. In other cases, institutional intervention may exacerbate the spread of radicaliza-
tion through a population of mixed beliefs. In such instances, our analysis implies that
social segregation may be a viable option against sectarian conflict.
1. Introduction. Recent years have seen the resurgence of ethnic, religious and
racial tension that have created rifts among communities once at peace. In many cases,
friction has escalated towards violent conflict, ethnic cleansing and at times even full-
fledged civil wars that have destabilized entire social and political systems [3, 4, 7, 18, 20,
24, 27, 30]. The development of viable intervention strategies to mitigate radicalization
Received May 22, 2018.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 91D10, 34C28, 62H30.
E-mail address: dorsogna@csun.edu
c©2016 Brown University
1
2 YAO-LI CHUANG, MARIA R. D’ORSOGNA, AND TOM CHOU
and violence requires a thorough understanding of the mechanisms underlying sectarian
conflict. Identifying the basic ingredients that lead to the emergence of full scale conflict
is hindered by the complex nature of human behavior. Instead of simplistic, univer-
sal interpretations and solutions, one is often left with contradictory observations and
outcomes.
In particular, there is controversy as to whether social segregation should be em-
ployed to manage sectarian conflicts [4, 10]. Some studies suggest that inter-ethnic or
inter-communal contacts raise tension and that it is beneficial to keep rival communities
separate until tensions dissipate [3, 7, 18, 24, 25, 27, 30]. Others have concluded that
ethnically mixed environments encourage inter-ethnic friendship and trust, while segre-
gation leads to prejudice and antagonistic behavior [3, 4, 10, 20, 26]. These contradicting
conclusions reveal the context-dependent nature of human social behavior.
One of the goals of this paper is to present a mathematical framework that may
help resolve basic observations of belief dynamics, radicalization, and conflict. Social
studies have shown that humans often hysteretically switch behaviors, perceiving and
reacting to the same information in drastically different ways because of different past
experiences and circumstantial contexts. This hysteretic switching behavior also applies
to general tolerance towards others and their views. Similar socio-economic environments
in some cases have led to peaceful coexistence between communities, in others to conflict.
Within the context of radicalization we model this hysteresis using a memory-dependent
or “bistable” response to the social environment [21, 22]. To quantify this mode-switching
behavior, we draw inspiration from the physical sciences, where bistability is ubiquitous;
for example, in ferromagnetism where materials switch their magnetic alignment as an
external field is varied [5].
Fig. 1(a) depicts the hysteresis curve of a system in which a bistable state variable ρ
(y-axis) is driven by an independent regulating variable σ (x-axis). The curve represents
the equilibrium solution to, e.g., a differential equation for ρ in which σ is a controlling
parameter. The solid parts of the curve indicate stable values of ρ, while the dashed
segment are unstable solutions. The functional dependence of ρ on σ yields a window of
values D < σ < E in which two stable solutions can arise.
Within the context of belief/radicalization dynamics, ρ may represent the degree of
radicalization of a population or an individual that is driven by social tension σ. An
interesting and frequently observed phenomenon is that of a slowly deteriorating politi-
cal, economic or social situation (increasing σ) which seems under control but abruptly
escalates. The lower solid curve indicates a less radicalized population (low ρ) that fa-
vors peaceful coexistence with others of different views. Increasing social tension can
force ρ to transition from the lower to the upper solid curve at σ ≥ E. The upper
curve represents a highly radicalized population that is non-tolerant towards those with
different views. The “bifurcation point” E thus marks a sudden escalation of sectarian
conflict which can be triggered by random events. Once the situation escalates, it is
often very difficult to restore peace, as ρ remains on the upper solid curve even if σ is
decreased back below E. Peace can only be restored if sufficient effort is made to further
reduce σ below the lower bifurcation point D < E. The hysteresis between high and
low radicalization levels may help shed light on contradicting reports regarding whether
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Fig. 1. (a) A typical bistability curve. The curve qualitatively cap-
tures the essence of escalating conflicts and radicalization ρ due to
rising tension σ. Bifurcation values of the tension σ are labelled D
and E. (b) A simplified piecewise constant description of the bistable
dependence of ρi on σi.
the promotion of ethnic mixing or segregation is the best approach to achieve a state
of peaceful coexistence. Just like tension can rapidly escalate, it may also rapidly de-
escalate. One example might be the decades-long Northern Ireland conflict. As late as
1993, some scholars were still very pessimistic on a possible peaceful resolution of the
Catholic/Protestant conflict, stating that: “the cruel conflict will continue, apparently
with no end in sight...” [10, 25]. However the 1994 IRA ceasefire quickly lead to the
1998 signing of the Good Friday Agreement, marking the end of “the Troubles.” To
phenomenologically incorporate bistability one can, without loss of generality, adopt a
simplified description of the relationship between radicalization and tension, as shown in
Fig. 1(b).
To understand influence of behavioral memory on the spread of radicalization and
conflict, we will incorporate this bistable dynamics into the belief dynamics model of
DeGroot, which describes an individual’s the belief as a one-dimensional continuous
variable bounded by two extreme limits [9, 14, 15]. Over time, individuals may change
their opinions by interacting with others. In the DeGroot model, originally introduced to
study the formation of consensus opinions in a network, conformity is the only ensured
outcome. The inability to form heterogeneous distributions of opinions, or “persistent
disagreement”, limits the applicability of the model to ethnically or ideologically diver-
gent societies [1, 2, 11, 32]. Extensions of the DeGroot model have been proposed to
induce disagreement, such as the popular “bounded confidence” model, where individu-
als interact only with those holding similar opinions, defined by an opinion range called
the bounded confidence [8, 12, 13, 19, 31].
Another approach is taken via “opinion opposition” models that introduce agents of
“nonconformity” who adopt contrarian views and cause polarized beliefs and disrupt
the formation of consensus [11, 17]. Such models share similarities with spin glass Ising
models that describe a mixture of ferromagnetic and antiferromagnetic molecules; the
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former tend to align their spins with neighbors, while the latter anti-align. Since sectarian
conflicts usually arise and progress through direct conflict of opinion, we will adopt an
opinion opposition approach rather than a bounded confidence approach. Assuming
that opinion differences among individuals causes tension, we incorporate bistability to
quantify the level of radicalization that may prompt an individual to radicalize.
We note that relatively peaceful, albeit tense, coexistence between communities of
different backgrounds can be ensured by a strong or influential player, such as the state,
a dictator, inter-communal institutions, or the international community. The removal
of such a player correlates with outbreaks of violent conflicts [6, 10, 16, 30]. Thus, we
will also incorporate the influence of a central figure, modeled as a globally connected
player exerting institutional influence similar to the concept of media influence on locally
connected networks [29].
In the next Section, we present the details of our basic model of radicalization and
sectarian conflict. We then augment the basic model to include government propaganda
and explore how it influences sectarian conflict. One of our aims is to use our model
to inform strategies that can stop radicalization and sectarian violence from spreading
among an ethnically mixed population without employing population segregation as a
peace-keeping method. Results of our analysis will be presented in the Results and
Discussion Section, where parameter dependence will also be explored.
2. Bistable lattice model of conflict. We assume a two-dimensional N × N site
lattice model where each site i is populated by an agent. Two dynamical variables are
associated with each agent: a continuous “belief” variable −1 ≤ φi(t) ≤ 1 indicating
the strength of belief in an ideology of agent i, and a discrete “radicalization” variable
ρi(t) ∈ {0, 1} indicating the intolerance of agent i towards a very different ideology.
Since radicalization usually leads to conflict, we will use the two concepts interchangeably.
Radicals cause conflict; non-radicals allow for peaceful coexistence. As shown in Fig. 2(a),
we color-code the two extreme belief values φ = −1 and φ = +1 blue and red respectively,
while lighter colors indicate intermediate values. Despite the continuous belief values,
we divide the population into red (φi > 0) and blue (φi < 0) groups and refer them as
two sects. We assume a fully occupied periodic lattice without empty sites, and that the
occupying agents do not migrate.
The values φi(t) and ρi(t) evolve over time via nearest-neighbor interactions. Nearest
neighbors are defined using the “Moore neighborhood,” where eight grid sites surrounding
site i are considered, as shown in Fig. 2(b). In the following subsections we describe the
model that governs the evolution of φi(t) and ρi(t).
2.1. Belief and radicalization. The magnitude of belief |φi| measures the level of en-
thusiasm of agent i. Individuals with |φi| ≈ 1 are belief zealots while those with |φi| ≈ 0
are belief apathetics. In addition to the belief variable φi, a discrete radicalization vari-
able ρi ∈ {0, 1} describes how an agent perceives other beliefs. An intolerant individual
at site i will be assigned ρi = 1 and referred to as a radical. Conversely, a tolerant non-
radical will be described by ρi = 0. Within the context of our model, φ and ρ describe
distinct attributes. Zealots can be tolerant of the opposite sect and be non-radical. For
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Fig. 2. (a) Schematic of the belief variable −1 ≤ φi ≤ 1. Posi-
tive and negative values respectively represent the degrees of belief
towards the extreme red and the blue ideologies. The color-coding in-
dicates different values of φi, with darker colors designated for more
zealous beliefs. (b) Definition of nearest neighbors [i]. We define
nearest neighbors of agent i according to its Moore neighborhood,
which include the eight lattice sites surrounding site i. (c) Definition
and color-code of radicalization ρi. The discrete value of ρi is de-
termined via the simplified piecewise constant function in Fig. 1(b).
ρi = 1 represents radicals and is colored red or blue, depending on
the corresponding sign of φi. Non-radicals have ρi = 0 and are
colored white, regardless of their belief value φi.
example, zealots may be deeply religious individuals who at the same time are accepting
of others’ beliefs.
The site-specific variables φi and ρi depend on each other through an intervening
social tension variable σi. The basic mechanism for this interplay is that the tension
σi felt by agent i arises from differences in belief (φi − φj) between agents i and j. In
turn, the level of tension σi determines the radicalization state ρi of agent i, who finally
adjusts its belief φi accordingly. As mentioned in the Introduction, we will assume ρi to
be bistable. The dynamical model is mathematically described below.
2.2. Tension and belief adaption. The tension σi perceived by agent i is determined
as follows:
σi[ρ(t), φ(t)] ≡
∑
j∈[i]
J(ρi, ρj) (φi − φj)
2
, (2.1)
where the coupling coefficient J(ρi, ρj) characterizes the sensitivity of agent i with radi-
calization ρi towards the view expressed by agent j with radicalization ρj . The sum over
j is then taken over Moore neighborhood of i, [i], as shown in Fig. 2(b).
Eq. 2.1 allows for tensions to increase when neighbors i and j have different belief
levels as modulated by J(ρi, ρj). By construction, if all sites neighboring i carry the
same belief value φi, the perceived tension σi = 0. The functional dependence of J(ρi, ρj)
will be defined in the Model Parameters section. Since the maximum of |φi − φj | = 2,
0 ≤ σi ≤ 32max(J), where max(J) is the maximum of J(ρi, ρj).
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The discrete value assigned to ρi is determined by the piecewise-constant hysteresis
function illustrated in Fig. 1(b) and depends on whether σi, determined in Eq. 2.1,
exceeds a “radicalization point” E, is below a “pacification point” D, or lies in between.
The bistable dependence of ρi on σi can be expressed as follows
ρi(σi(t))


= 1 if σi(t) > E,
= 0 if σi(t) < D,
unchanged otherwise.
(2.2)
Since D and σi (and consequently J in Eq. (2.1)) can be rescaled by E; without loss of
generality, we can set E ≡ 1. Phenomenologically, Eq. (2.2) allows high tension to drive
a non-radical toward radicalization, while low tension may pacify a radical.
We assume the radicalization state ρi feeds back to φi via a modified continuous-time
DeGroot model to include contrarian behavior as follows.
dφi(t)
dt
=
∑
j∈[i]
k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) (φj − φi) (2.3)
where k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) > 0 is the rate of change of belief from φi towards φj . Negative k
indicates a φi that drifts away from φj . The functional dependence of k will be defined
in Model Parameters section
Note that Eq. (2.3) can also be written in the form φi(t+ dt) =
∑
j Mijφj(t), where
Mij = k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj)dt for j ∈ [i], andMii ≡ (1−
∑
j∈[i] k(ρi, ρj, φi, φj))dt. For discrete-
time DeGroot models dt = 1 and the matrixM is known as the “trust matrix” satisfying∑
jMij = 1. To prevent φi(t) from exceeding the bounds, we further implement no flux
boundaries by requiring k → 0 at φi = ±1.
The rules governing the belief value φi, the intolerance level ρi, and the perceived
tension σi, are given by Eqs. 2.3, 2.2, and 2.1, respectively. With initial conditions and
definitions of the parameter functions J(ρi, ρj) and k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) in the next section,
these equations fully define our bistable radicalization and belief dynamics model.
2.3. Model parameters. In this subsection, we define the dependence of J(ρi, ρj) and
k(ρi, ρj, φi, φj) and then determine the number of independent parameters of the model.
We first discuss the coupling function J(ρi, ρj) and assume that interactions with or
between radicals heighten the sensitivity towards belief diversity, resulting in higher
social tension. We thus assign
J(ρi, ρj) =
{
J− if ρi = ρj = 0,
J+ otherwise,
(2.4)
where J+ ≥ J− ≥ 0 quantify high and low sensitivities.
For the rate of change of belief presented in Eq. (2.3), it is required that k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj)→
0 at |φi| = 1 to prevent φi from exceeding the bounds. For |φi| < 1, we set k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) =
±1 to most simply describe conformation and dissension. If agent i finds the be-
lief of its neighbor j agreeable, φi “ferromagnetically” adjusts towards φj at the rate
k(ρi, ρj, φi, φj) = 1. Conversely, if neighbor j antagonizes agent i, k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) = −1
and φi shifts away from φj , resulting in an “antiferromagnetic” behavior. Finally we
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assume the following qualitatively reasonable rules to determine whether belief confor-
mation or dissension occurs.
(1) A non-radical (ρi = 0) conforms to the beliefs of neighboring non-radicals but
dissents from the beliefs of radicals (ρj = 1), regardless of their belief φj of the
neighbors. In this case
k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) =
{
1 if ρi = 0 and ρj = 0
−1 if ρi = 0 and ρj = 1
(2.5)
(2) A radical conforms to the beliefs of neighbors of the same sect and dissents from
the beliefs of neighbors of the opposite sect, regardless of their radicalization
level. In this case
k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) =
{
1 if ρi = 1 and φiφj ≥ 0
−1 if ρi = 1 and φiφj < 0
(2.6)
The above assignment of k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) is summarized in Table 1 below and is illustrated
in Fig. 3. The discontinuity of k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) at |φi| = 1 can be made continuous by
setting k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) = ± [1− tanh((|φi| − 1)/ǫ)/2] with an infinitesimal parameter
ǫ ≪ 1. For numerical simulations, we may choose ǫ at the same order as the time step
size.
❅
❅
❅
❅
φj
ρj
φi
ρi φi > 0
ρi = 1
φi > 0
ρi = 0
φi < 0
ρi = 1
φi < 0
ρi = 0
φj > 0
ρj = 1
+1 −1 −1 −1
φj > 0
ρj = 0
+1 +1 −1 +1
φj < 0
ρj = 1
−1 −1 +1 −1
φj < 0
ρj = 0
−1 +1 +1 +1
Table 1. The table lists the value of k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj), depending on
ρi and ρj , as well as φi and φj .
Note that k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj) need not be symmetric with respect to the interchange of i
and j since individual i’s reaction toward individual j will in general be different from
that of j’s toward i. This is a major difference between human interactions and physical
interactions, which are typically symmetric.
With the definition of J(ρi, ρj) = J± and k(ρi, ρj, φi, φj) = ±1, our equations now
have three independent constant parameters: D, J+ and J−. Other adjustable pa-
rameters not in the equations include the size N of the periodic lattice and the initial
conditions. We vary the initial red-to-blue population ratio, which we denote as R(0),
and unless specified otherwise, we set J− = 0.03, J+ = 0.6, D = 0.1, R(0) = 3/7 and
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the functional dependence of the belief
evolution rate k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj). Depending on ρi, radicals and non-
radicals adopt conformation (k = 1) and dissension (k = −1) behav-
ior differently. Non-radicals (ρi = 0, left panel) determine k based
on ρj ; radicals (ρi = 1, right panel) determine k based on the sign
of φiφj , i.e., whether individual j belongs to the same sect.
-1 0 -1
λ0
ℓ ℓ
Fig. 4. A global institutional influence function G(φi;φ0). The func-
tion is defined by three parameters: the institutional stance of belief
φ0, the strength of the influence λ0, and the broadness of institu-
tional messages ℓ. For φ0 − ℓ < φi < φ0 + ℓ, G(φi;φ0) < 0 and the
tension σi decreases. However, outside this range, σi increases.
N = 100 as our default parameter values for simulations of Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3). These
values are chosen based on our extensive parameter sweep as described in Results and
Discussion section.
2.4. Institutional influence. While the basic model (Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3)) describes the
spread of radicalization, we may also wish to include intervention strategies that may
alleviate conflict. Historically, a more peaceful coexistence of divided populations are
facilitated by the presence of a strong or influential central figure, such as a state, a
dictator, inter-communal institutions, or the international community [6, 10, 16, 30].
While such a central figure can influence various facets of a society, in this paper we
mainly consider how the outreach of government institutions affects social tension.
We model a governmental institution as a globally connected player that adopts a
stance φ0 on the belief scale [29]. Institutional publicity or incentives may appease
individuals holding similar beliefs to φ0, causing a reduction of the social tension they
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perceive. However, for individuals with significantly different beliefs compared to φ0, the
perceived tension may increase. We model the influence of the institutions on the social
tension perceived by agent i via a simple three-parameter quadratic function
G(φi) =
λ0
ℓ2
(φi − φ0)
2
− λ0, (2.7)
as plotted in Fig. 4. Under governmental influence, the social tension obeys
σi[ρ(t);φ(t)] =
∑
j∈[i]
J(ρi, ρj) (φi − φj)
2
+G(φi;φ0). (2.8)
The constant λ0 represents the strength of the institutional influence and is proportional
to, say, the available resources and invested efforts. The half distance ℓ between the two
x-axis intercepts characterises the broadness of the institutional message. Within the
range φ0 − ℓ < φi < φ0 + ℓ, G(φi) < 0. Here the institutional message is assumed to
be appeasing to individual i, leading to the reduction of its social tension σi. However,
individuals with beliefs outside of this range will experience an increased tension.
For simplicity, we assume that the institutional stance φ0 does not directly sway a
belief φi, leaving Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) intact. However, an institution may indirectly
steer the beliefs of a general population towards its stance by reducing social tensions
and thus encouraging conformity towards φ0.
In the following section, we first identify the scenarios that lead to the spread of
radicalization in the basic model Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3) without institutional influence. We then
include such institutional influence by replacing Eq. (2.1) with Eq. (2.8) and explore the
outcomes.
3. Results and discussion. We first examine the basic model Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3) with-
out institutional influence to investigate the dependence of φi and ρi on the five adjustable
parameters: J+, J−, D, N , and R(0). Simulations of the basic model are carried out
by numerically integrating Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3) using a semi-implicit method to update the
levels of belief φi and radicalization ρi. The numerical discretization is detailed in the
Appendix.
The initial conditions of the simulation were set at ρi = 0 and randomly drawing values
of φi from a uniform distribution. We further rebalanced φi such that the φi > 0 to φi < 0
(red-to-blue) ratio was R(0) = 3/7. Next, we placed a radical agent (ρ∗ = 1) with belief
φ∗ = 0.9 at the center of the lattice. For the rest of the paper, ρ∗ = 1 and φ∗ = 0.9
will be used as the initial values of the radical agent at the center of the lattice if such a
seed is planted. The results are qualitatively similar for sufficiently extreme values of φ∗
(φ∗ & 0.9 or φ∗ . −0.9). Uncertainty however rises with smaller |φ∗| as the radical seed
tends to be increasingly pacified at the onset of our simulations. A snapshot of φi and
ρi at t = 1 is shown in Figs. 5(a) and (b), respectively, and the default parameter values
are used for the simulation. Note that by normalizing |k(ρi, ρj , φi, φj)| our simulation
time t is defined on the belief-changing time scale. In Fig. 5(a) we use the color codes
in Fig. 2(a) to depict φi for each individual i, with darker red/blue colors representing
more extreme views among the respective sects. In Fig. 5(b) we plot the corresponding
ρi using the color codes in Fig. 2(c), where radicals are marked by red/blue grids and
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(a) ρ(b)
Fig. 5. A snapshot of the spatial distribution of (a) φi and (b) ρi
during a simulation. (a) The color codes (see Fig. 2(a)) reflect the
intensity level of belief, with red and blue indicating the two opposing
opinions. (b) The corresponding radicalization values ρi using the
color codes in see Fig. 2(c). The simulation is initiated with ρi =
0 and randomly drawn φi from a uniform distribution such that
R(0) = 3/7. A radicalized agent with ρ∗ = 1 and φ∗ = 0.9 is seeded
at the center of the lattice, which triggers the spread of radicalized
population. The simulation is conducted on a 100× 100 lattice, but
the images here are cropped to better show the radicalized population
at the center. The other parameters are set to the default values.
non-radicals white. As can be seen, radicals tend to exhibit a more extreme level of belief
than non-radicals. The latter mostly conform toward relatively neutral beliefs if not in
contact with radicals. However, one can still see darker spots in Fig. 5(a) in the regions
corresponding to non-radical sites in Fig. 5(b). This shows that regions in which zealots
are not radicalized can be sustained, and peaceful coexistence can be achieved. During
the simulation, non-radicals can be radicalized by their radical neighbors, leading to an
outward spread of radicalization from the initially planted radical seed. Considering
that radicalization often precedes conflicts, this “contagion” effect may be referred to as
“escalation diffusion” of conflicts, which was identified as a dominant mechanism driving
the spread of conflicts [28].
This scenario can also be described as “heterogeneous nucleation” of an “antiferromag-
netic” phase within the context of solid state physics. In addition to nucleation by radical
agents, under different parameter regimes, our model can also exhibit other qualitatively
different dynamics, as displayed in Fig. 6. The behaviors outlined here qualitatively
represent those of all possible parameter choices, as confirmed by extensive simulations.
Using the same initial conditions as in Fig. 5 but choosing J− = 0.01, J+ = 0.1, Fig. 6(a)
depicts a permanently calm situation where φi converges towards an intermediate con-
sensus value throughout the lattice except near the initially planted radical. Although
its neighboring agents become zealots, as shown by the darker blue colors, they remain
non-radical and prevent radical attitudes from spreading. We refer to this outcome as one
of “perpetual calm.” Fig. 6(b) displays the same results as in Fig. 5 for J− = 0.03 and
J+ = 0.6. We denote this behavior as “seeded radicalization.” Finally, in Fig. 6(c), the
parameters J− = 0.06, J+ = 0.4 lead to a hypersensitive system where non-radicals can
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t=0
t=1
spontaneous
radicalization
seeded
radicalization
perpetual
calm
ρ
ρ
ρ
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 6. Three typical evolutions of the model Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3): (a)
a perpetual calm situation (J− = 0.01, J+ = 0.1), (b) seeded radi-
calization (J− = 0.03, J+ = 0.6), and (c) spontaneous radicalization
(J− = 0.06, J+ = 0.4). The left panel shows the initial conditions
of φ and ρ with an radical seed at the center of the lattice. In
the perpetual calm situation, the radical seed is unable to radicalize
anyone else. In the scenario of seeded radicalization, radical popu-
lation spreads out from the initially seeded radical through nearest-
neighbor interactions. For spontaneous radicalization, non-radicals
turn radical without getting in contact with another radical agent.
The other parameters of these simulations D = 0.1, R0 = 3/7, and
N = 100.
spontaneously radicalize. Clusters of high tension “antiferromagnetic” domains spon-
taneously arise in a manner similar to homogeneous nucleation. We call this type of
response “spontaneous radicalization.” These three scenarios comprise all qualitatively
distinct outcomes of the model seeded with a radical agent at the center of the lattice.
To quantitatively compare the three qualitatively different outcomes shown in Fig. 6,
we compute
(a) mean radicalization: ρ¯(t) =
1
N2
∑
i
ρi(t)
(b) (φ>0)(φ<0) (red:blue) ratio: R(t) =
∑
iH(φi)∑
jH(−φj)
(c) mean belief value: φ¯(t) =
1
N2
∑
i
φi(t)
(d) polarity of belief: P (t) =
1
N
√∑
i
(φi(t)− φ¯(t))2,
(3.1)
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where H(x) = 1 for x > 0 and 0 otherwise is the Heaviside function. Here, φ¯(t) can be
interpreted as a consensus belief, and P (t) is the standard deviation of belief.
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Fig. 7. Time series of (a) radical fraction ρ¯(t), (b) red-to-blue pop-
ulation ratio R(t), (c) mean belief value φ¯(t), and (d) polarity of
belief P (t) for the scenarios of perpetual calm (solid curves), seeded
radicalization (dashed curves), and spontaneous radicalization (dot-
ted curves). For the perpetual calm situation, decreasing P indicates
that individual φi conforms to a consensus. During the conforma-
tion of φi, red population is converted to blue, as demonstrated by
the decreasing R(t). In the other two scenarios, the emergence of
radicals eventually causes φi to deviate from the consensus, leading
to high P . The emerging radicals, mainly blue, also prompt non-
radical blue individuals to switch sides, leading to a rising trend of
R(t). The parameters for each of the three scenarios are the same as
in Fig. 6.
Fig. 7(a) shows the radical fraction ρ¯(t) as a function of time. For the case of perpetual
calm (solid curve), none of the non-radical agents are turned radical by the planted radical
seed, and ρ¯(t) = 1/N2 throughout the simulation. If the sensitivity J± to different neigh-
boring beliefs is increased, radicalization can spread radially from the radicalized seed.
The thin dashed curve in Fig. 7(a) shows that the area fraction increases quadratically
with time, implying that the typical length scale of the “antiferromagnetic” radicalization
phase increases linearly in time. If the minimum sensitivity J− is further increased, ten-
sion between neighboring non-radicals with different beliefs is not low enough to prevent
spontaneous radicalization. In this case, ρ¯(t) (thick curve) rises quickly to its maximum
of unity.
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Fig. 7(b) plots the evolution of the red-to-blue population ratio R(t). In the case of
perpetual calm, belief conformity prompts all agents to join the majority blue sect. In
the other two cases, the minority red sect members initially conform to the blue ideology.
However, once the number of radicals increase, some blue non-radicals become alienated
by blue radicals and are driven towards a more red belief, progressively turning into red
radicals.
Fig. 7(c) shows that under calm conditions the average opinion φ¯(t) remains constant.
Under these conditions k(φi, φj , ρi, ρj) is symmetric for every i-j pair and dφ¯/dt = 0.
The value of φ¯(t) = −0.2 is thus set by the initial red-to-blue ratio R(0) = 3/7. For the
two radicalization scenarios, the increasing number of radicals that adopt extreme beliefs
causes φ¯(t) to deviate from φ¯(t = 0).
Finally, in Fig. 7(d) the polarity P (t) shows convergence of φi towards a consensus
belief in the case of perpetual calm. This is typical for canonical DeGroot models, except
that the planted radical seed prevents P (t) from vanishing asymptotically. In the case
of seeded radicalization (dashed curve), P (t) initially decreases due to fast conformity
followed by a slower increase during which radicalization spreads. If radicalization is
spontaneous, the initial conformation phase of decreasing P (t) is overcome by a more
rapid radicalization rate that leads to larger polarity.
We find that the sensitivity of non-radicals J− is the primary determinant of whether
spontaneous radicalization emerges or not. In Fig. 8(a), we plot radical fractions versus
J− for several values of J+ at a long time after initiation (t = 50) to identify the parameter
regimes where spontaneous radicalization arises. Initial conditions are set at σi = 0 and
a randomly distributed −1 ≤ φi ≤ 1 with R(0) = 3/7. No radical agents are planted
at t = 0. In the absence of a radical seed, non-radicals become radicalized exclusively
through the tensions arising from belief differences amongst themselves. We find that
spontaneous radicalization is triggered for J− > 0.04 and that this threshold does not
depend on J+. For low values of J+ . 0.2, the spread of radicals can be arrested after
the emergence of spontaneously radicalized patches. As a result, radicals do not pervade
society even at long times.
Henceforth, we plant a radical seed at the center and set J− = 0.03 to focus on
seeded radicalization, a qualitatively reasonable description of the nucleation and growth
of sectarianism. Recalling that σi ≤ 32max(J), we have σi ≤ 0.96 < 1 if J = J−
everywhere, eliminating the chance of spontaneous radicalization. As long as J− < 1/32,
spontaneous radicalization cannot arise. In Fig. 8(b), we plot radical fractions ρ¯(t = 10)
as a function of J+ for various initial red-to-blue ratios R(0). Radicals begin to spread
from the planted seed when J+ > 0.25 regardless ofR(0). For larger J+, the radicalization
cluster reaches a larger fraction of the lattice indicating a faster spreading rate. A larger
initial ratio R(0) also causes the cluster of radicals to spread at a faster rate. This is
confirmed in Fig. 8(c) where radical fraction ρ¯(t = 10) for J+ = 0.6 increases with R(0),
and is maximal for R(0) & 0.75, where the members of the two sects are about equal.
These findings are consistent with the observation that conflicts mostly arise in regions
where ethnic boundaries were not well-defined (i.e., a mixed population) and where the
populations of ethnic groups are closely matched [23]. A minority population that is
overwhelmed by a much more populous opposing belief more easily assimilates and is less
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Fig. 8. Parameter dependence of the basic model (Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3)).
(a) Spontaneous radicalization triggered by increasing J−. Long-
time (t = 50) radical fractions of simulations without initial radical
seeds are plotted against J− for various J+ values. When J− ex-
ceeds a threshold, non-radicals spontaneously radicalize. For long
enough time and sufficiently large J+, the spontaneously emerging
radicals spread through the entire population. (b) Spread of seeded
radicalization regulated by J+. Radical fractions at an intermedi-
ate time (t = 10) are plotted against J+ for various R(0) ratios. A
larger J+ causes radicals to spread faster, reaching a higher radical
fraction at an intermediate time. (c) Intermediate-time (t = 10) rad-
ical fraction versus R(0) for R(0) ≤ 1. More closely matched initial
red and blue populations also result in faster spread of radicals. (d)
Time for the radicalization cluster to reach 80% of the system area
for various lattice domain size N . The time increases linearly with
N , suggesting a linear radial expansion of the cluster over time. If
not varied in the figures, the default parameters values are used. An
initial radical seed is planted for figures (b)-(d) but not (a). Each
data point represents the mean value of ten simulations, and error
bars the standard deviations.
likely to elicit conflict. An example can be found in Indonesia, where analysis of survey
data suggested that the spread of radical beliefs was subdued in villages consisting of a
notably dominant majority population [3].
In Fig. 8(d) we plot the time T80 for the radicalization cluster to cover 80% of the
lattice, which for our simulations corresponds roughly to the time it takes for the cluster
perimeter to reach the boundaries of the lattice. We find that T80 increases linearly with
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domain size N , suggesting that the radius of radicalized cluster area grows linearly with
time, and that the corresponding area scales as t2, consistent with Fig. 7(a).
Finally, we find that tension σi rarely decreases among a mixed population, precluding
de-radicalization. As a consequence, we find that the value of D has essentially no effect
on seeded radicalization in our basic model Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3).
3.1. Global institutional influence. So far we have investigated the parameter depen-
dence of the basic model Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3). We now explore how an external institutional
influence may affect radicalization. We set the basic model parameters to the default
values (J− = 0.03, J+ = 0.6, D = 0.1, R(0) = 3/7, and N = 100) and focus on the
fast seeded radicalization regime, shown in Fig. 6(b) in the absence of any external play-
ers. We here add a global institutional influence G(φi;φ0) by replacing Eq. (2.1) with
Eq. (2.8).
In Fig. 9(a) we plot the long-time (t = 50) radical fraction ρ¯(t = 50) and examine
the effect of λ0, which defines the intensity of the tension-reducing influence. We choose
φ0 = 0 and ℓ = 1, so that the external institution adopts a neutral stance and reduces
perceived tension for individuals with any belief value φi. For these parameters, we
observe significant and consistent reduction of radical fractions when λ0 & 1.6. For
λ0 & 2.5, the spread of radicals by the seed is largely suppressed. Hence, one of our
major findings is that to exert significant influence λ0, the institutional influence needs
to have a high penetration within the overall population.
In Fig. 9(b), the radical fraction ρ¯(t = 50) is depicted using a color intensity map
and plotted as a function of ℓ and λ0. As expected, the lowest radicalization levels are
achieved by large λ0 and ℓ, indicating that for a strong influence intensity to pacify
conflicts, the institutional publicity must also have broad appeal. Note that in realistic
situations the institutional influence intensity and message breadth are often constrained
by the resources available to the institution. It may thus become impractical to simulta-
neously achieve high penetration and broad appeal given limited resources. How to most
effectively allocate resources is an interesting optimization problem.
In Fig. 9(c) we plot ρ¯(t = 50) against ℓ and φ0 with λ0 = 2. The largest reduction
of radicals is occurs in the tongue near the neutral institutional stance φ0 = 0, but
diminishes as ℓ is decreased. Some reduction of radicals is also observed when −1 <
φ0 < −0.5, corresponding to a stance biased toward the majority belief. Although this
latter regime −1 < φ0 < −0.5 does not result in as significant a reduction in radical level
as the φ0 ≈ 0 tongue for ℓ ≈ 1, the reduction occurs over a wider range of ℓ. We thus
find that if the institution is unable to fashion a message with sufficiently broad appeal,
it may be better bias the influence to appease the majority.
In Fig. 9(d) we show ρ¯(t = 50) versus λ0 and φ0 with ℓ = 1. Again, a neutral
institutional stance (φ0 = 0) achieves the most reduction of radicals, while a majority-
biased stance also has some success but to a lesser degree. With respect to influence
intensity λ0, we find that the effectiveness of a majority-biased diminishes quickly with
decreasing λ0, while a neutral stance is capable of maintaining a better result at a lower
λ0.
Our results suggest that an institutional influence achieves optimal results if the entity
carefully adopts a strong but neutral stance between the two conflicting beliefs. However,
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Fig. 9. (a) Reduction of radical fraction for various strengths of
global institutional influence λ0. We plot long-time (t = 50) radical
fractions versus λ0 while setting institutional stance φ0 = 0 and
message breadth ℓ = 1. When λ0 & 1.6, the institutional influence
begins to show significant effect, and radicals have mostly stopped
spreading when λ0 & 2.5. (b) Long-time (t = 50) radical fractions
versus ℓ-λ0, (c) ℓ-φ0, and (d) λ0-φ0. The color maps represent radical
fractions. For (b) the institution adopts a neutral stance φ0 = 0. The
most reduction of radicals is achieved at high λ0 and large ℓ. For
(c), we set λ0 = 2. A neutral (φ0) and a majority-biased stance
(φ0 ∼ −0.5) both register significant reduction of radicals. For (d)
we choose ℓ = 1, and again φ0 = 0 and φ0 ∼ 0.5 results in significant
reduction of radicals. Each data point represents the mean value of
ten simulations, and error bars in (a) the standard deviations.
the outreach of the institutional message content is also important. If the institutional
influence targets a narrow range of beliefs for the reduction of perceived tension, it may
alienate those out of reach, and may have the opposite effect of increasing radicalization.
If the institution is unable to placate population with a wide range of beliefs, a stance fa-
voring the majority view may be an effective alternative. Of course, other mechanisms of
external influence may apply. For example, governing institutions may directly influence
people’s beliefs rather than just the tension they perceive. To model such mechanisms,
a modification of Eq. 2.3 can be developed.
4. Conclusions. In this paper, we construct a belief dynamics model that incorpo-
rates a bistable radicalization process to describe the spread of sectarian conflict. While
the model equations can be applied to arbitrary social network structures, we simulate
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our model on a locally connected two-dimensional square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions. By defining belief and radicalization as separate variables, our model allows
for a more nuanced description that distinguishes belief from radicalization. Although in
the absence of radicals, all non-radicals asymptotically conform to an apathetic/neutral
consensus due to the simplicity of the model, we do observe transient enclaves of more
zealous but non-radical individuals. Radicals, on the other hand, are mostly zealots with
extreme belief values. We examine the parameter dependence of the model and identify
regimes leading to three distinct evolution paths. In the regime of perpetual calm, non-
radical individuals cannot be radicalized even if by planting radical seeds in advance.
In the regime of spontaneous radicalization, non-radical individuals may spontaneously
radicalize even in the absence of radicals. Between the above two regimes lies the regime
of seeded radicalization, where non-radical individuals cannot spontaneously radicalize
but can become radical upon contact with other radicals. For subsequent investigations,
we choose parameter values in the third regime, as the most realistic scenario for the
propagation of sectarian conflicts. We find that radicalization can be suppressed by a
numerically more dominant majority population between the two competing sects. Fi-
nally we implement institutional influence as a globally connected player and find that
the most effective intervention to pacify conflict is to adopt a strong but neutral view.
Our model represents a first step in studying the bistable (or multistable) nature of
human behaviors in the development of social conflicts. Our incorporation of bistability
is only phenomenological, while the underlying mechanism is a fundamental but much
more challenging to design and include. Moreover, the separation of ideological belief
and radicalization that we propose is a simplified version of multi-dimensional opinion
dynamics models. Our modeling framework can be extended to include multiple ideolog-
ical spectrums, such as religion, social economics, and politics, and examine the interplay
among them. Finally, our model can be straightforwardly extended to include evolving,
non-lattice social networks.
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Appendix: Numerical implementation. For numerical simulations, we adopt a
semi-implicit method with a fixed time step size to integrate our model. Let us denote
φi(t), ρi(t), and σi(t) at a discrete time t = n∆t as φ
n
i , ρ
n
i , and σ
n
i , where ∆t is the time
step size. Then we discretize Eqs. (2.1)-(2.3) as
σn+1i =
∑
j∈n.n.[i]
J(ρn+1i , ρ
n+1
j )
(
φn+1i − φ
n+1
j
)2
, (A1)
ρn+1i =


1 if σn+1i > 1,
0 if σn+1i < D,
ρni otherwise,
(A2)
φn+1i = φ
n
i +∆t
∑
j∈n.n.[i]
k(ρni , ρ
n
j , φ
n
i , φ
n
j )
(
φnj − φ
n
i
)
, (A3)
and an iterative method is used to solve the semi-implicit equations (A1)-(A3). The
equations with global institutional influence are solved in the same way. Note that for
an explicit method, Eq. (2.2) may impose a severe constraint on ∆t, and even with an
adaptive time step size, the numerical integration can still be very inefficient.
